This paper analyzes the joint responses of commodity futures prices and traders' futures positions to changes in the VIX before and after the recent financial crisis. We find that while financial traders accommodate the needs of commercial hedgers in normal times, in times of distress, financial traders reduce their net long positions in response to an increase in the VIX causing the risk to flow to commercial hedgers. By exploiting a cross-section of traders, we provide micro-level evidence for a convective flow of risk from distressed financial traders to commercial hedgers. The presence of such risk convection confirms the market impact of financial traders conditional on trades initiated by them and motivates an extension of the long-standing hedging pressure theory of commodity futures markets to incorporate time-varying risk capacities of financial traders.
equilibrium, the direction of the resulting risk flow reflects which side has the greater exposure.
Like the convection of a current of air that flows from a high-pressure area to a low-pressure area, a "risk convection" makes the risk flow from the more distressed groups to the less distressed groups. We test the direction of the convective risk flow by examining the joint dynamics of commodity futures prices and the traders' positions in response to changes in the VIX.
We identify account-level data on each trader's positions in commodity futures markets by making use of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC's) Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) database. By regulation, when a trader's position in a commodity futures contract becomes larger than a certain threshold, clearing members are obligated to report the trader's end-of-day positions in the commodity to the CFTC. The reportable traders in the LTRS account for 70%-90% of open interest in any given commodity futures contract. Based on each trader's registration with the CFTC and its positions in the LTRS database, we classify the trader as a commercial hedger, a hedge fund, a commodity index trader (CIT), or another category.
Hedge funds and CITs are the two major groups of financial traders. Hedge funds typically exploit price divergences across different futures contracts for the same commodity or among multiple commodities; while CITs, a new class of traders that emerged during the mid-2000s, tend to be long-only portfolio investors who treat commodity futures as a new asset class among more traditional asset classes, such as stocks and bonds.
Our baseline analysis examines the aggregated position response of CITs, hedge funds, and commercial hedgers to changes in the VIX. We find that after September 2008, both CITs and hedge funds displayed immediate significant and negative position responses to increases in the VIX in a large number of commodity futures markets. Commercial hedgers took the other side and displayed a positive position response to increases in the VIX, meaning they tended to reduce their net short positions just as uncertainty was rising. The increases in the VIX were also accompanied by significant price drops in almost all commodity futures. The pattern of position changes indicates a convective flow of risk from financial traders towards commercial hedgers and thus greater exposures of financial traders to the VIX. In contrast, prior to September 2008, neither financial traders nor commercial hedgers exhibited significant responses to the VIX.
By exploiting the cross-section of traders within different trader groups, we also provide additional empirical evidence in support of the greater exposures of financial traders. First, we find that CITs with larger CDS spreads were more sensitive to changes in the VIX. We interpret this finding as further direct support of the link between the financial distress of CITs and reductions in their futures positions. Second, we find that in response an increase in the VIX net short hedgers bought commodity futures, while net long hedgers did not reduce their positions or even bought commodity futures. We interpret this evidence as confirming that the VIX increase did not drive greater incentives for hedgers to hedge than for financial traders to reduce their positions. Taken together, the empirical evidence shows that during the financial crisis, in response to a spike in the VIX, financial traders consumed liquidity from commercial hedgers instead of providing liquidity to facilitate the hedging needs of commercial hedgers.
We also provide evidence to show that the trades induced by the VIX changes between financial traders and hedgers were not due to potential informational advantage of financial traders. Our results are robust to including various controls. To show our results do not rely on our use of the CFTC's proprietary LTRS data, we also reconfirm similar convective flows in positions of different trader groups covered by the CFTC's public Commitment of Trader reports.
Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the financialization of commodity futures markets. The growing presence of financial traders in these markets together with episodes of large price volatility stimulated a heated, ongoing debate regarding whether the trading of financial traders affects commodity futures prices (e.g., Tang and Xiong 2010; Buyuksahin and Robe 2010; Stoll and Whaley 2010; Hamilton and Wu 2011; Irwin and Sanders 2011; and Singleton 2011) . In particular, a commonly test used in the extant literature is to examine whether the correlation between financial traders' futures position change and futures price change is positive. This test, while intuitively appealing, ignores the different reasons for financial traders to trade in commodity futures markets. When they trade to accommodate hedgers (as posited by the traditional hedging pressure theory), their position change is negatively correlated with futures price change. On the other hand, when they trade in response to their own financial distress (as emphasized by the distressed financials theory), their position change is positively correlated with futures price change. By netting out these two offsetting effects, the unconditional correlation between their position change and price change has an ambiguous sign, which helps explain the lack of any significant correlation between the position changes of CITs and futures prices in the data. By conditioning on VIX shocks during the recent crisis, our analysis sorts out trades initiated by CITs and hedge funds and demonstrates their price impacts as a result of their own financial distress.
Our results also add to the broader finance literature on the market impact of distressed financial institutions. This literature offers limited micro-level evidence. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) describe two episodes in which specialized arbitrageurs lost significant amounts of capital in convertible bond markets and, as a result, turned from liquidity providers to liquidity consumers. Adrian and Shin (2009) document cyclical leverage and balance sheets of financial brokers and dealers. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) document the reallocation of mortgage-backed securities during the recent financial crisis from institutions dependent on repo financing, such as hedge funds and broker-dealers, to institutions with more secured financing, such as commercial banks. Equipped with detailed end-of-day position data for almost all participants in the commodities futures markets, we not only examine the position changes of financial institutions, but simultaneously examine position changes of commercial hedgers, who, we find, facilitated the reduction in positions of financial institutions. The latter establishes a channel for distressed financial institutions to transmit systemic risk to the commodity markets and impact the real economy.
Taken together, our results motivate the need to expand the long-standing hedging pressure theory of commodity futures markets with additional considerations of potential financial distress of financial traders. This theme echoes that of several earlier studies. Tang and Xiong (2010) argue that the increasing presence of index traders in commodity futures markets improves risk sharing in these markets at the expense of having volatility spillover from outside markets. Etula (2010) emphasizes the risk-bearing capacity of securities brokers and dealers as an important determinant of risk premia and return volatility in commodities markets. Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2010) show that decreases in financial traders' risk capacity lead to increases in hedgers' hedging cost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces a theoretical framework and discusses our empirical designs. Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3, we provide summary information on participation of different trader groups across different commodity futures markets. Section 4 examines the joint responses of futures prices and traders' positions to VIX changes across a set of commodity futures markets. Section 5 concludes the paper. We also provide an Online Appendix to report additional data description and empirical results.
Theories and Empirical Designs
This section provides a theoretical framework to highlight convective risk flows in commodity futures markets by integrating the longstanding hedging pressure theory with the distress financials theory. We then discuss designs of our empirical analysis.
A theoretical framework
The hedging pressure theory emphasizes that hedgers short sell commodity futures to hedge the inherent commodity price risk in their business operations. By taking the other side of hedgers' short positions, financial traders share their risk and dampen the impact of their risk exposures on commodity futures prices. The distressed financial institution theory highlights that at times, and especially during financial crises, funding and risk constraints may cause financial traders to voluntarily or involuntarily liquidate their futures positions. As hedgers now need to take the other side of financial traders' liquidation, risks flow back to hedgers. Our analysis focuses on testing such convective risk flows during the recent financial crisis. This section provides a simple, theoretical framework to integrate the hedging pressure theory and the distressed financials theory, and, in particular, to highlight convective risk flows.
Consider a futures market with 2 groups of participants, a group of hedgers and another group of financial traders. The two groups trade a futures contract written on a commodity. We consider only one period (possibly out of many periods in a more general model), during which random shocks cause the two groups of traders to change their positions. In particular, we specify the following demand curves for the two groups:
, , where and are the futures position changes of the hedgers and financial traders across the period. is the futures price change. The coefficients 0 and 0 are the slopes of the two groups' demand curves with respect to the price change . These slopes also represent the two groups' capacities to absorb each other's trades. is an idiosyncratic shock that causes the hedgers to increase their short position in the futures contract. We also introduce another shock , which motivates the financial traders to reduce their position. One can think of the shock as a shock to VIX during the financial crisis, which induced financial stress to financial traders. 0 measures the financial traders' exposure to the shock. We also allow the shock to affect the hedgers although with a smaller degree. In other words, financial traders have a greater exposure than hedgers to the shock (i.e., .)
Market clearing imposes an add-up constraint on and :
0.
That is, one group has to absorb the position bought or sold by the other group. The price acts as the key mechanism to balance the two groups' net demand. Simple algebra gives that the futures price has to change by
which is accompanied by the following position changes:
and . 3
Equation (1) nests the hedging pressure theory in the sense that the presence of financial traders dampens the price impact of the hedgers' idiosyncratic shock . That is, a higher value of leads to a smaller exposure of the futures price to due to the financial traders' greater capacity to share the hedgers' shock (e.g., equations (2) and (3)).
Equations (2) and (3) also highlight the convective risk flow induced by the shock from the financial traders to the hedgers. For illustration, consider the simple case with 0 (i.e., the shock does not affect the hedgers.) In this case, the shock nevertheless causes the hedgers to increase their futures position by . This is because the shock causes the futures price to drop by , which in turn induces the hedgers to buy back their short position.
More generally, as long as 0 (i.e., the financial traders' exposure to the shock after adjusting for the groups' capacities is greater than the hedgers'), the hedgers buy back some of their futures position in response to the shock. As a result, a convective risk flow emerges.
Our empirical analysis anchors on documenting such a convective flow in the commodity futures markets during the recent financial crisis. It is convenient to interpret the financial traders in our model as CITs. Equations (1) and (3) show that hedgers' shock and financial traders' shock induce opposite correlations between the futures price change and financial traders' position change . When financial traders trade to accommodate hedgers' shock , they provide liquidity and their position change is negatively correlated with the price change. On the other hand, when they trade in response to their own shock, they consume liquidity and their position change is positively correlated with the price change. The unconditional correlation of their position change and the price change nets out these two offsetting effects:
The sign of this unconditional correlation is ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitudes of the two terms in the bracket. The ambiguous sign helps explain why the extant literature often fails to find a significant correlation between the trading of CITs and futures price change. At the same time, it also motivates more systematic tests of price impacts of CITs and other financial traders after conditioning on trades initiated by them or accommodated by them.
Our analysis of convective risk flows exactly serves as such a conditional test.
Empirical designs
In our empirical analysis we focus on using the change of the VIX as a proxy for the shock and analyzing the convective risk flows induced by the VIX change in different commodity futures markets. As noted in the introduction and in Figure 1 , open interest in many commodity markets collapsed around the time of the financial crisis just as the VIX was rising. During this time, the observed correlation of commodity prices with the VIX also increased dramatically. Index were more synchronized with the VIX Index than during historical periods.
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The distressed financials theory emphasizes that financial institutions may become consumers rather than providers of liquidity when they suffer large losses or when they face severe funding risk. As commonly recognized by the extant literature, the VIX directly affects the funding liquidity of both of these financial institutions. As the VIX spikes, these institutions may face more stringent funding requirements from their lenders and thus have to reduce the leverage of their risky holdings. In particular, the theory predicts that this effect is non-linear and is particularly strong during a crisis after financial institutions suffer large losses and are vulnerable to any additional funding shock. As a result, during the recent crisis they could have responded to increases in the VIX by reducing their commodity exposures. As we shall discuss in the next section, this theory is applicable to both CITs and hedge funds, two major groups of financial traders in the commodity futures markets, during the financial crisis. Thus, we expect a spike in VIX during the crisis to reduce their willingness to hold positions in commodity futures.
2 The highly synchronized price movements were commonly observed during the financial crisis in other asset markets. It is also possible that the observed rolling correlation rises because the volatility in both markets rise even though the underlying correlation remains the same. For our purposes, this poses isomorphic research questions: Why does volatility rise in both markets simultaneously, and which, if any, groups of traders were driving this market volatility?
The hedgers' incentives to hedge may also vary during a financial crisis. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) develop a model for corporate hedging under the premise that external sources of capital are more costly than internally-generated funds. This funding wedge motivates firms to hedge their cash flow risk so that they have sufficient cash to finance future profitable investment opportunities. As an increase in the VIX raises the funding wedge, they should have greater incentives to hedge. Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2010) argue that hedging commodity price risk allows a commercial hedger with leverage to reduce default risk and thus the subsequent default cost. An increase in the VIX exposes all leveraged firms to greater default risk, which, in turn, also gives commercial hedgers greater incentives to hedge their commodity price risk. Thus, regardless of the reasons for hedging, an increase in the VIX gives commercial hedgers greater incentives to hedge, and more specifically, for short hedgers to take greater short positions in commodity futures and long hedgers to take greater long positions. As commercial hedgers are mostly on the short side, the hedging pressure hypothesis implies that, during the financial crisis, commercial hedgers are expected to increase their net short positions in commodity futures in response to an increase in the VIX. 
The Data and Market Participants
The CFTC publishes weekly reports on long and short positions of trader groups: the Commitments of Traders (COT) and the Supplemental COT on Commodity Index Traders. The data underlying these public reports comes from the CFTC's proprietary LTRS database. As described in detail below, the LTRS data, which we use in this study, includes disaggregated end-of-day positions for each large trader in all commodity futures and options markets subject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC.
Our data spans January 1, 2000 to June 1, 2011. We first apply a sequence of data-cleansing steps, described in detail in the Online Data Appendix. We focus on large traders with positions in the 19 U.S. commodity futures included in the Standard & Poor's-Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SP-GSCI Index) and the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBSCI). Table 1 lists these commodities and their respective index membership.
The LTRS data
The CFTC's Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) compiles daily data of traders' long and Although we have data on positions for each individual futures contract expiration, we aggregate the number of contracts across commodities to gain a total picture of a trader's exposure to that commodity. To facilitate interpretation, we normalize positions to a notional dollar value using fixed-index contract prices as of December 15, 2006. As our empirical tests focus on each individual commodity separately, this ad hoc choice of date is innocuous as it is simply a scaling factor on the number of contracts.
We define excess returns in a commodity as the returns from holding a generic futures contract that tracks the currently indexed contract. This is the return to a position that is always invested in the currently indexed contract. It accounts for a roll return where the position in the currently indexed contract is liquidated and reinvested in the next indexed contract at the end of the day before the generic contract begins tracking the next indexed contract. During a month in which the index calls for the generic contract to switch underlying contracts, we roll contracts on the fifth business day of that month. 4 We roll contracts according to the S&P GSCI roll schedule, which generally rolls out of shorter-dated contracts in the month before expiration (when delivery is close and liquidity drops) and into the next liquid longer-dated contract. 5 Tracking the indexed contract also ensures that our generic contract is always liquid. To facilitate outside replication, we construct this rolling return from the settlement price data of underlying futures contracts in Bloomberg.
In addition to end-of-day exposure information, each trader in the LTRS database has a number of specific attributes that identify its registration, designation or reporting status (e.g., a commodity pool operator or a commercial distributor). In our analysis, we make use of both the disaggregated positions and the registration/designation/reporting status of large traders. We use this information, as well as the prior year's position patterns, to classify each trader in any given year. We give a rough outline of our classification below; full details are in the Appendix.
Major groups of market participants
Commercial hedgers such as farmers and producers regularly trade commodity futures to hedge 4 The GSCI rolls smoothly over the fifth through ninth business days; for simplicity we switch contracts on the fifth day. The monthly roll schedule for the GSCI is provided in the Data Appendix. We define the fifth business day as the fifth trading day of the month, where a trading day is a day in which all 19 commodities have positions. 5 The DJ-UBSCI switches contracts on a more infrequent schedule. We use the S&P GSCI schedule for most commodities as it rolls more frequently. When switching to the longer-dated contract, the GSCI will occasionally skip certain expirations for liquidity reasons (e.g., October gold is skipped). For soybean oil and copper, we use the DJ-UBSCI roll schedule, since soybean oil is not in the GSCI and the GSCI tracks copper contracts traded in London (for which we have no data) rather than the CME.
commodity price risk inherent in their commercial activities. For example, farmers enter into short positions in grains futures contracts to lock in prices on crops that are yet to be harvested.
That way, if cash prices for grains go down, the farmers make less by selling their crop to a local elevator, but gain on their short futures positions on, for example, the Chicago Board of Trade.
On the other hand, bakers and feed producers who need to buy grain from elevators enter into long grain futures positions. For them, if cash prices for grains go up, they need to pay more to buy from a local elevator, but gain on their long grain futures positions at the exchange. Despite the diversity of the commercial hedgers, in the aggregate they tend to be net short in commodity futures. The long-standing hedging-pressure theory posits that commercial hedgers need to offer premia to attract non-commercial buyers to absorb their net short positions due to a limited commercial buyer interest on the long side. 6 In our analysis, we classify commercial hedgers as traders in the LTRS system with registration, reporting and designation codes that clearly indicate commercial use in all the commodities in which they trade. We use a conservative classification compared to the Commitment of Traders (COT) reports in that we require commercial usage in all commodities in which a trader trades, as well as an explicitly stated purpose for commercial usage (e.g., a "Livestock Feeder").
Hedge funds who trade in commodity derivatives must register with the CFTC as Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs). If they do not trade commodity derivatives, but provide advice to their clients, they must register as Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs). These funds invest others' money on a discretionary basis in commodities, commodity futures, and options on futures. They make use of leverage as only a fraction of money that must be paid to enter into a position. Moreover, they face far fewer trading restrictions than traditional money managers, such as mutual funds and pension funds. For example, they may enter into both long and short positions, trade spreads, and construct complex trading strategies, which include both commodity derivatives and cash positions. The use of leverage makes funding risk an important part of their business. In several historical episodes, inability to secure funding caused some hedge funds to "bail out" of positions during market stress, such as the crisis of the Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. In our analysis, we classify hedge funds as traders who are registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators and commodity trading advisors or designated in the LTRS as managed money.
A new breed of commodity market participants-commodity index traders-emerged during the mid-2000s. After the U.S. equity market collapsed in 2001, attractive historical returns from investing in commodity futures together with their slightly negative correlations with equity returns, as summarized by Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) , motivated many prudent buy-side financial institutions, such as university endowments, insurance companies, and pension funds, to incorporate commodities as a new asset class in their portfolios. These institutions tend to focus on strategic asset allocation between commodities and other asset classes, including stocks and bonds, and designate assets among specific commodities to a commodity investment index that tracks performance of a basket of commodity futures contracts. 7 Thus, they are often referred to as commodity index traders. 8 As CITs are exposed to stock market fluctuations through their stock positions, they may need to tighten up their risk exposures in commodities after suffering large losses in stocks. Unlike CPOs and CTAs, CITs are not a registered category with the CFTC. We identify CITs based on the CIT classification of the CFTC's Supplemental COT report and two additional criteria motivated by the trading patterns of broad-based portfolio investors in commodity indices: 1) they should be invested in many commodities (greater than eight in our sample); and 2) they should be mostly net long in those commodities over the previous year (more than 70% net long in our sample).
The netting problem and conflicting groups
The CFTC's LTRS database is designed for market oversight and enforcement purposes over 7 A commodity index functions like an equity index, such as the S&P 500, in that its value is derived from the total value of a specified basket of commodity futures contracts with specified weights. These contracts are typically nearby contracts with delivery times longer than one month. When a first-month contract matures and the secondmonth contract becomes the first-month contract, a commodity index specifies the so-called "roll" (i.e., replacing the current contract in the index with a following contract). In this way, commodity indices provide returns comparable to passive long positions in listed commodity futures contracts. By far the largest two indices by market share are the SP-GSCI and the Dow-Jones UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBS). These indices differ in terms of index composition, commodity selection criteria, rolling mechanism, rebalancing strategy, and weighting scheme. Instead of entering positions on individual futures contracts, CITs typically purchase financial instruments that give them exposures to returns of a commodity index. There are three types of such instruments: commodity index swaps, exchange-traded funds, and exchange-traded notes. 
Other data
Our data on the VIX, S&P 500 Total Return, and GSCI come from Bloomberg. We use the following weekly macroeconomic indicators as control variables: the Baltic Dry Index (from Bloomberg), the Moody's Baa credit spread (from the Federal Reserve Board), and the 10-year inflation compensation (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2010; data from their paper). 10 Our choice of macroeconomic indicators is constrained by our desire to focus on a weekly frequency. The
Baltic Dry Index (BDI) tracks worldwide international shipping rates and is a measure of global demand for commodities; higher values represent higher shipping rates and greater expected demand. Higher Baa credit spreads indicate worsening credit conditions in the economy, and higher inflation compensation generally indicates higher inflation expectations.
Market Participation of Different Trader Groups
Commodities futures markets have grown dramatically over the past decade, and the nature of market participation has changed dramatically as well. Table 2 In contrast, the median commercial hedger was net short $7 million while the median hedge fund was net long $1.3 million.
Second, hedge funds tend to have slightly net long exposure, with 60% of their contracts 10 The Bloomberg codes for VIX, S&P 500, and BDI are VIX Index, SPTR Index, and BDIY Index, respectively. 11 The number of traders is low compared to those reported in the public COT reports. In this sense, our classification scheme is conservative and likely an underestimate of the size of the CIT sector. For our purposes, we are more interested in the time series properties of changes in true CIT behavior. Table 2 ), there is a subset of hedgers taking net long positions. These net long hedgers are clustered in the lower right corner of Figure A2 in the Online Appendix.
As indicated in Table 2 Figure 4 plots the aggregate net notional positions (using fixed prices) for each of the five sectors of commodities, and these observations seem to hold within each sector. However, it is evident that the netting problem is severe in the energy and metal sectors, with CITs "appearing" to take even a net short position in metals. This is consistent with the CFTC's acknowledgement in the Supplemental COT report that CIT positions are difficult to measure in the energy and metals markets due to the heavy use of derivatives in these markets.
To summarize the differences across trader groups, we compare second moments of trader flows rather than the first moments of levels. In contrast to other trader groups, commodity index traders should be relatively passive, and this is borne out in the data. Figure 4 shows that the volatility of position changes in grains, livestock, and softs is strikingly lower for CIT traders. Table 4 reports the results from estimating a linear regression where the left-hand side variable is the weekly commodity return and the right-hand side variables are weekly VIX changes. We allow for VIX changes to affect commodity prices with a delay, and thus use the contemporaneous, as well as one lag of weekly VIX changes on the right-hand side. We also control for one lag of commodity returns to allow for persistence in commodity price movements, 
Empirical Results

VIX changes and commodity returns
as
VIX changes and trader positions
We now estimate the effect of changes in the VIX on the changes of aggregate positions of different groups of traders. We focus on the aggregate positions of different trader groups as we are interested in identifying which groups have been driving the price, and do not want small individual traders who may behave in a nonsystematic way to change our analysis. We estimate the same specification in Table 4 but with position changes on the left-hand side. As discussed above, the netting problem in the LTRS position data is particularly severe for commodities in the energy and metal sectors. This problem contaminates our analysis of the relationship between traders' positions and VIX changes for these commodities. Below, we report results only for commodities in the grains, livestock, and softs sectors.
Our running null hypothesis is that the VIX did not systematically affect a given trader group's position changes. One alternative is that increases in the VIX positively affected CIT and hedge fund positions and negatively affected hedger's positions. This would be consistent with an increase in the VIX causing greater incentives for hedgers to hedge. Another alternative predicts the VIX increase may have induced greater distress to financial traders than to hedgers.
As a result, it may have negatively affected CIT and hedge fund positions, while positively affected commercial hedger positions. Given the negative correlation between VIX changes and commodity returns in the post-crisis period, the economic content of this prediction is that both CITs and hedge funds were willing to sell at such deep discounts that commercial hedgers were willing to reduce their net short positions as the VIX rose. In contrast, Table 5 shows that commercial hedgers tend to display a positive relationship between VIX changes and position changes. The relationship is positive and statistically significant for 8 of the 12 commodities, with only one negative point estimate. The average economic significance among all 12 commodities is +0.16-standard deviations. Interestingly, the other unclassified traders are similar to commercial hedgers: the relationship is negative and statistically significant for 8 of the 12 commodities, with an average economic significance of +0.15 standard deviations. This is perhaps not surprising given the CFTC's designation of commercial hedgers.
Panel B of Table 5 The patterns in Table 5 show that changes in the VIX had asymmetric impacts on commodity futures markets participants after September 2008. An increase in the VIX led both CITs and hedge funds to sell commodity futures, which commercial hedgers bought. This pattern indicates that CITs and hedge funds were more sensitive than hedgers to changes in the VIX during the financial crisis due either to changes in risk appetite or funding concerns.
The finding that commercial hedgers were buying, rather than selling, as the VIX increased is inconsistent with the traditional hedging pressure theory with a single focus on the hedging incentives of commercial hedgers. This theory implies that during the financial crisis, an increase in the VIX incentivized commercial hedgers to hedge (i.e., to increase their aggregate short positions in commodity futures). Instead, they reduced, rather than increased, their short positions. This buying behavior on the part of hedgers is remarkable in light of the observation that hedgers who were short stood to make extreme profits from the steep price fall during the financial crisis. That is, they provided liquidity to financial traders, while financial traders consumed liquidity.
Cross-sectional evidence
We examine the responses of different traders within the same group to further isolate our competing hypotheses. We manually matched large traders identified as CITs to the names of their respective firms and collected their CDS spreads from Bloomberg. 13 For each week, we split the group of CIT accounts into accounts with high CDS spreads (above the median) and low CDS spreads (below the median). We regress the account-level position change as the left-hand side variable on the change in the VIX, an indicator for whether the trader has a high CDS spread, and the interaction of these two terms, and again control for the same set of weekly macroeconomic indicators.
Evidence on distressed financials. The distressed financials theory implies that
14 Table 6 reports the results from this regression. Consistent with the distressed financials theory, high CDS spread firms sell more, and, furthermore, are more sensitive to changes in the VIX in 5 of the 12 agricultural commodities: Chicago wheat, corn, coffee, cotton, and sugar. This regression exploits the relative ranking of firms with high and low CDS spreads. Alternatively, one may expect that the absolute level of CDS spreads is what matters. A regression that substitutes the raw log CDS spread in place of high/low indicator reveals nearly identical results, which are available from the authors upon request.
Another argument on hedging pressure.
For the traditional hedging pressure theory to explain the commercial hedgers' responses to changes in the VIX, their incentives to hedge would have to vary with the fluctuations of VIX. Table 5 suggests that commercial hedgers actually bought when the VIX was rising, contrary to most theories of hedging, which predict 13 For this portion of the analysis, we aggregate CITs and CIT-HFs due to the small number of CITs. 14 We cluster standard errors at the weekly level because position changes across traders may be correlated within a week given aggregate shocks. Clustering standard errors at the account-level generates nearly identical results, which are available from the authors.
that commercial hedgers, who are typically short, would actually increase their hedges and short more. However, one might argue that the specific reasons discussed in the previous section may be incomplete and that an unspecified reason might cause commercial hedgers to have reduced incentives to hedge after the VIX increases. Comparing the responses of long hedgers and short hedgers provides a channel to address this concern. While commercial hedgers are mostly on the short side, there are a number of long hedgers in our sample. As the greater hedging incentives motivate long hedgers and short hedgers to trade in opposite directions, we expect them to have opposite responses to VIX shocks if their trading was driven by fluctuations in their hedging incentives.
To explore this consideration, we classify a hedger as a "long hedger" in a commodity if the hedger maintained an average net long position in the previous calendar year. Specifically, for each day, we compute the fraction of long contracts in which a hedger is invested, and compute the time average over the year. If the average fraction is greater than 50%, we classify the hedger as long, while a fraction less than 50% corresponds to short. We then separately regress the aggregate position change of long hedgers on changes in the VIX, including both contemporaneous and lagged changes as usual and including one lag of commodity returns as a control, along with our weekly macroeconomic indicators. Table 7 reports the results and shows that, consistent with Table 5 , short hedgers drive the positive relationship between hedgers' position changes and changes in the VIX. However, there is no clear pattern of the opposite reaction for long hedgers. For example, it appears that although long hedgers were selling in sugar, in fact they were buying in Chicago wheat and coffee. This suggests that the long hedgers of coffee and Chicago wheat were trading in the same direction as the short hedgers, invalidating the argument that unspecified reasons might have caused hedgers to have reduced incentives to hedge after the VIX increases.
Informational advantage hypothesis
Traders might also trade against each other in order to exploit an informational advantage rather than to reallocate risk. Suppose that an increase in VIX contains negative information about commodity market fundamentals and that financial traders such as CITs and hedge funds are faster in absorbing the information than commercial hedgers. Then, we could expect that in response to an increase in VIX, commodity prices would co-move negatively with the VIX increase and financial traders would sell commodity futures to commercial hedgers. The premise of this informational advantage hypothesis is that by absorbing the information contained in VIX movements at a faster pace, financial traders can profit from commercial hedgers. As the more active hedgers tend to be more attentive to VIX movements than passive hedgers, this hypothesis naturally implies that passive hedgers are more likely than active hedgers to be on the other side of financial traders' trades in response to VIX changes.
We explore this informational advantage hypothesis by classifying a group of "active"
hedgers who have a record of trading both frequently and in large amounts. Specifically, we compute the median daily absolute position change for every hedger every year, and classify a hedger as active if it was in the top decile of all hedgers in that commodity in the previous year.
We use the median rather than the mean as we want to capture hedgers who consistently and frequently trade large amounts as opposed to those who trade extraordinarily large amounts infrequently. By the same reasoning, we use the absolute position changes as opposed to a measure of portfolio turnover. 15 We then aggregate active and passive hedgers and test whether the aggregate positions of active hedgers display a significantly more positive sensitivity to the VIX than passive hedgers in a panel of these two time series.
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In Table 8 , we regress weekly position changes on changes in the VIX, an indicator for the active group of hedgers, and an interaction between these two terms, along with one lag of commodity returns and our weekly macroeconomic controls and during the post-crisis period.
The active hedgers tended to be on the other side of the financial traders' trades in that they typically display a more pronounced positive sensitivity to the VIX, meaning that as the VIX rose, they were buying. This evidence is inconsistent with the informational advantage hypothesis. In the Online Appendix, we provide further evidence against the informational advantage hypothesis by showing that the position responses of financial traders and especially those of CITs are persistent even after a 13-week window, suggesting that they represent permanent position changes as opposed to transitory trading driven by informational advantages.
Comparability and further analysis
15 Ranking on portfolio turnover yields qualitatively results that hedgers with higher portfolio turnover in the previous year tend to display a significantly more positive sensitivity to the VIX than passive hedgers. 16 For our panel regression, we report standard errors clustered by time. FGLS estimates corrected for serial correlation yield nearly identical results. Table 9 reports results from our baseline analysis, which regresses position changes on movements in the VIX for the trader categories from the disaggregated COT reports, as well as the Supplemental CIT report. The results are consistent with those in Table 5 , which shows that producers' positions react positively to the VIX and that managed money traders react negatively to the VIX. Other financial traders are roughly neutral.
Comparability with COT reports.
Although CIT traders are not separately classified within the disaggregated COT reports, much of the CIT business is conducted through swaps. Consistent with this, swap dealers react negatively to the VIX in the disaggregated COT reports, although the statistical significance is limited. This is interesting as swap dealer positions are usually aggregated with commercial positions in the historical COT reports, which only break down commercial and non-commercial positions. Table 9 also examines how position changes of CITs respond to changes in the VIX, and confirm our earlier result that CITs react negatively. Notably, these positions are not simply a subset of any single category in the disaggregated COT reports, but instead are a mix of the swap dealer positions and managed money positions due to the netting problem described in Section 1. Therefore, our effects are not driven by our classification scheme.
Changes in expected commodity demand.
We also check whether our results may be explained by observable shifts in expected demand. One alternative explanation is that our results are fully explained by movements in demand not captured in our macroeconomic controls.
To examine this issue more closely, we collect monthly projections of world usage for the upcoming harvest issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for wheat, corn, soybeans, soybean oil, and cotton in its World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates reports. In the middle of each month, the USDA projects the usage of the coming year's harvest for these crops. We repeat our exercise at a monthly frequency and include the year-on-year percentage change in forecasted world usage as a control. Table 10 reports the results, which are very similar to our previous weekly results. We choose the year-on-year percentage change in forecast because each month's forecast is a forecast for that year's harvest, with the forecasted harvest year typically changing to the subsequent harvest year in May. responses in the commodity futures markets to the VIX changes. We focus on the VIX because of its intuitive appeal as a proxy both for the distress of financial traders and its relation to hedging demands of commercial hedgers. We are also motivated to explain the observed link between the two markets. We have re-run our analysis using total returns to the S&P 500 as the source of shocks and obtain qualitatively identical results. This exercise more directly measures shocks to equity markets and how CITs and hedge funds link the two markets.
Conclusion
We analyze the joint responses of prices and positions of all trader groups in the commodity futures markets to movements in the VIX. Although the price movements are naturally related to VIX movements as a fundamental, jointly analyzing positions and prices allows us to examine whether amplification effects due to distressed financial traders or hedging pressure are also at work. We find that CITs and hedge fund positions reacted negatively to the VIX during the recent financial crisis, with commercial hedgers taking the other side. traders than to hedgers, we find that CITs with high CDS spreads are more sensitive to movements in the VIX. Contrary to the traditional hedging pressure theory with a single focus on hedgers' hedging needs, we do not find that hedgers increased their hedges as the VIX rose.
Finally, the findings show that the reactions of all trader groups were persistent over time.
This evidence suggests that during times of distress, there was a flow of risk away from financial traders back towards commercial hedgers. Much like the convection of a current of air that flows from a high pressured area to low pressured one, this "risk convection" reallocates risk from the more distressed groups to the less distressed groups. The presence of such risk convection confirms the market impact of financial traders conditional on trades initiated by them and motivates an extension of the long-standing hedging pressure theory of commodity futures markets to incorporate time-varying risk capacities of financial traders. Contracts O c t 0 5 J a n 0 6 A p r 0 6 J u l 0 6 O c t 0 6 J a n 0 7 A p r 0 7 J u l 0 7 O c t 0 7 J a n 0 8 A p r 0 8 J u l 0 8 O c t 0 8 J a n 0 9 A p r 0 9 J u l 0 9 O c t 0 9 J a n 1 0 A p r 1 0
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Figure 2: Correlations between Changes in VIX and SP-GSCI Indices
The correlations are estimated from one-year rolling correlations of daily changes to the VIX and returns of SP-GSCI commodity index in different commodity sectors.
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J a n 0 1 J a n 0 2 J a n 0 3 J a n 0 4 J a n 0 5 J a n 0 6 J a n 0 7 J a n 0 8 J a n 0 9 J a n 1 0 J a n 1 1 S e p 1 1 We report coefficients from a weekly regression of commodity returns as the left-hand side variable on contemporaneous and one lag of changes in the VIX as right hand side variables, controlling for lagged commodity returns, percentage changes in the BDI, changes in the Baa credit spread, and changes in inflation compensation. Each row reports coefficients for a different commodity and each set of columns reports coefficients for different sample periods. For brevity, only the coefficients on the contemporaneous change in VIX are reported. Coefficients are reported where both returns and the VIX are in basis points. We use the Newey and West (1987) construction for standard errors with four lags. */**/*** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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